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1 Throughout 2015,  in every village of the Kilombero Valley in Tanzania,  the general
election  generated  fierce  debates  about  livelihood,  land  and  politics.  In  this
internationally coveted valley of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT),
the election echoed nationwide debates about corruption, economic growth, poverty
alleviation, infrastructure development and the growing power of the opposition. It
also raised specific concerns over whether and how local development plans improve
livelihood. During political meetings, village assemblies and even informal discussions
in hoteli,1 future elected local government bodies continuously exploited the main local
object of concern: land. In this highly desired space of the valley, the effects of the top-
down SAGCOT initiative on local land politics can be analyzed through the campaign
discourses relating to land investments and land access. These discourses were used by
local  elites as a strategy to maintain positions,  expand socio-political  power among
villagers,  prompt  mobilization  for  resistance,  or  garner  votes.  To  counter  specific
criticism of the internationally and locally debated land grabbing issue, local elites and
political party candidates used a plethora of discursive resources to enhance their self-
declared objective  of  “carrying the voice  of  the  people.”  They promised to  involve
villagers in the different steps of development projects by using a participatory and
inclusive approach and securing land through legal demarcation and title deeds. These
rhetorical tools went hand in hand with concrete strategies involving institutional and
physical violence, or solidarity and cooperation at different scales.
2 This article aims to understand how struggles for land access and control shape space
and how election campaigns highlight the complexity and the heterogeneity of  the
social, political, and economic powers between villages and among villagers. I will first
analyze  how  government  leaders  and  candidates  use  land  regulations  and  tools  to
maintain their  authority  over local  politics.  This  will  help understand their  role  in
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development planning and in the way village subdivisions can be used as a means of
control by district and ward political agencies, especially during election times. This
geographical  approach  to  land  tenure  aims,  more  broadly,  to  highlight  the  link
between  control  of  the  physical  space  and  control  of  the  social  space,  as  well  as
between space and politics.
3 Thus, I look at the role of election as a singular event in the so-called “participatory”
processes for negotiations on land transaction which are drawn up by international
institutions  yet  always  involve  the  local  level  in  one  way  or  another.  Generally,
research on land grabs has highlighted inequalities in accessing negotiations: women
and young people are generally not involved in decision-making processes that are
often conducted by “representatives of traditional authorities and some elders [who]
participate  in  consultations”  (Kraut  2014:  294).  However,  it  should  be  noted  that
detailed studies of these processes and of the integration of villagers within public-
private partnerships are still limited. In addition, the consequences these negotiations
have on the restructuring of social bonds within communities and families, depending
on the socio-geographical situations of the spaces where the investments occur, are not
well known either. We will see how these “top-down” initiatives—especially upstream
and  during  the  elections—engender  social  differentiation,  transform  local
representations, and create enmity among the wards. These processes are the result of
leaders’ discourses aimed at dividing the organization of any resistance and/or gaining
new  voters.  On  the  other  hand,  some  candidates  organize  collective  action  and
resistance in support of people’s desire to keep “their land.” They may also resort to
physical  violence.  Lastly,  the  article  will  address  the  reactions,  strategies  and,
ultimately,  voting  behavior  of  local  people.  These  vary  according  to  different
geographical  locations  or  activities  and  the  emergence  of  resistance  committees,
themselves  riddled  with  deep  socio-political  tensions.  These  representations,  in  an
“area of movement” (Haggett 1965), are not only related to the necessity of keeping a
piece of “land” rather than a socio-political “space.” They are also linked to the role
and impact of people migrating from other already “grabbed” lands, or from urban
areas, in search of new investments.
 
There Is a Politics of Land because Land Is Political2
The Geography of Power
4 At the national level, campaign discourses during Tanzania’s 2015 general election did
not  necessarily  center  on  land  issues,  even  though John Magufuli,  the  presidential
candidate of the party in power and former single party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM),
repeatedly promised to “reclaim [unused] land [that] will be given to poor farmers and
livestock  keepers”  (The  Citizen 6 September  2015).  After  he  was  elected  as  the  new
president  of  the  country,  he  further  stated  that  “land  reforms  [were]  needed  for
promoting incentives to the actual tiller of the land for the promotion of agricultural
production”  (The  Citizen 28 November  2015).  Agreeing  with  those  who  contest  “the
neocolonial  land grabs” and with Kawe Member of  Parliament (MP) Halima Mdee’s
declarations about land conflicts in the Boko area,3 the opposition candidate of the
CHADEMA (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo), Edward Lowassa, also declared that
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foreign investors would be asked to work in partnership with local communities (The
Citizen 8 September 2015; The Guardian 9 November 2015).
5 Interestingly, the Kilombero Valley villagers, who gathered to watch the national news
on TV every evening in their village’s hoteli, were more interested in what their ward4
candidates had to say about land than they were in what the presidential candidates
had  to  say.  This  was  because,  more  generally,  ward  representatives  are  “directly
involved  in  local  politics  and  can  bring  concrete  changes”  (Focus  group  Mofu,
interviews Namwawala 08/2015). Elections at the ward level are closely linked to their
everyday experience,  that  is,  to  the proximity and tangibility of  power,  as  political
promises are “more likely to happen” (Interview with G.N., Ihenga village, 08/2015) and
to impact their lives. Indeed, during elections, the “social network, proximity [that the
ward  and  MP  candidates  have]  to  the  centers  of  power,  the  availability  of  certain
government if not private resources are considerable advantages”5 (Martin 1988: 162)
in gaining villagers’  support.  The party that a candidate represents is not the most
relevant  indication  of  voting  behavior:  villagers  are  quite  likely  to  vote  for  an
opposition candidate at ward level or as member of parliament, and for a ruling party
candidate  at  national  level.  Support  can  vary  between,  for  example,  the  kitongoji,6
village  chairman  and  village  committee  elections—all  of  which  happened  in
December 2014. In the villages of the valley, which were created mainly thanks to the
growth of the railways during the Ujamaa period and are today threatened by loss of
access to land, past and present land development policies vary significantly. During
the election, political meetings reinforced existing power relations but also provided a
forum in which people’s concerns could be raised. In this article, I therefore consider
that political events need to be addressed “not on the front of formal institutions, ‘but
on that of actions that aim to maintain or modify the established order’” (Balandier
1995:  ix),  quoted  by  Martin  1988:  97).  Politics  is  the  expression  of  symbols,
performances,  discourses  and  conceptual  logic  that  stem  from  organizational,
institutional, rules and systems of social norms. Politics is not the prerogative of the
state, but it unfolds through the relational dynamics between several levels, from the
local to the global and vice-versa, in ways that are conditioned by the spaces on which
they are being built.
6 Starting from this premise, an exploration of land issues in the 2015 election campaign
requires  adopting an approach anchored in  the  “geography of  power”  (Raffestin  &
Turco 1984) according to which “politics is built in space and space builds politics”8
(Dulucq & Soubias 2004: 9). This perspective embraces the general idea that “there is a
politics of space because space is political”9 (Lefebvre 2000 [1974]).  Indeed, societies
have always built their socio-political organization on the resources they could exploit.
Land is one of these: it is, to quote Karl Polanyi, “an element of nature (…) linked with
the organizations based on family, neighborhood, job and belief—along with the tribe,
the temple, the village, the guild and the church.” (1983 [1944]: 254). In the geography
of power, power is not seen as coming from the “top” but it flows at and from every
scale and is inherent to social, economic, political, and cultural relations (Foucault 2001
[1977]). Power does not follow a “zero sum game” whose attributes would be acquired
by  the  “dominants”  over  the  “dominated”  (Raffestin  1980).  I  link  the  conceptual
framework  of  the  geography  of  power  to  the  perspective  developed  in  political
anthropology, and more specifically the anthropology of development (Balandier 1967;
Bailey  1969;  Long  1994;  Olivier  de  Sardan  1995).  This  considers  conflicts—but  also
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cooperation—related to access to and control over the same coveted resources, land, as
being part of a “political arena” (Olivier de Sardan 1995; 2004) made up of multiple
actors,  intertwined  scales  and  competing  dynamics.  Lastly,  as  “particular  political-
economic  moment,”  elections  and  electioneering  can  shape  and  reveal  power
relationships concerned with land, which is one of the most coveted resources in East
Africa (Rutten & Owuor 2009; Médard 2008; Boone 2011). According to Catherine Boone,
with regard to the 1992 Kenyan election, “election-time political effects of land-related
tensions  can  be  dramatic”  (2011:  2).  Indeed,  candidates  use  land  as  a  patronage
resource to gain support,  promising “to reward supporters  with land rights  and to
revoke the land rights of non-supporters” (Ibid: 310).  These are part of the dramatic
dynamics which this article will explore.
 
Coveted Land in the Kilombero Valley
7 Tanzania is  one of the main countries affected by the so-called “farmland rush” or
“land  grab,”  which  has  been  the  subject  of  international  debate  since  2008.  The
phenomenon, as defined by the international institutions and a majority of researchers
—bar  a  few exceptions11—would not  cover  land surfaces  acquired before  2000.  This
suggests that it is a new phenomenon, yet grabbing land is rooted in a long process of
land appropriation and concentration in Africa. Clearly, “it can rightly be asserted that
this  phenomenon  was  at  the  heart  of  the  colonial  enterprise  in  Africa,  and  has
continued  to  define  its  post-colonial  political  and  economic  interactions  with
international capital (Richard et al. 2010). What is new, and has raised concerns among
advocates for rural land rights, is the scale and pace of these acquisitions” (Mollel 2014:
112). Some authors characterize the land grabbing phenomenon in Tanzania mainly
with reference to the reallocation of colonial estates to new investors (Charlery de la
Masselière & Racaud 2013). The Kilombero Valley, however, is a highly coveted space
and has seen different types of land enclosures, encroachments or dispossessions at
different  scales  of  space  and  time,  not  only  involving  colonial  estates.  Recent
investments have targeted either conservation areas or estates set up during colonial
times  or  during  Ujamaa  Vijijini;  these  areas  have  been  reallocated  to  major
international actors (Sulle & Nelson 2013; Kimaro & Hieronimo 2014; Geenen & Hönke
2014).  The  colonial  estates  which  were  abandoned  by  the  colonizers  or  parastatal
companies have been occupied and used by farmers and pastoralists who are referred
to as “invaders” or “squatters” by government officials or new investors.
 
The Land Enclosures in Kilombero
8 In  the  Kilombero  Valley,  some estates  were  demarcated  and established  under  the
colonial regime before being nationalized in the 1960s and then privatized in the late
1980s.  For example,  the Kilombero Sugar Company Ltd (KSCL) owns two 12-hectare
sugar cane estates,  one on either side of the Great Ruaha River in the north of the
valley (Martiniello 2015; Sulle and Smalley 2015). The cultivation of sugar cane in the
valley was introduced by the Asians in the 1930s. In August 1960, the plantation under
the aegis of the erstwhile Dutch consul (Martiniello 2015: 7) was created, supported by
colonial  laws and financial  instruments  (Sprenger  1989;  Beck 1964).  In  1967,  it  was
nationalized and in 1975 it was placed under the control of the Sugar Development
Corporation  (SUDECO12),  financially  supported  by  international  institutions  (the
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International  Finance  Corporation,  the  Commonwealth  Development  Corporation
(CDC),  the  Standard  Bank  of  East  Africa,  and  the  Netherlands  Overseas  Finance
Company). In the 1960s-1970s, Ujamaa Vijijini led to the creation of several villages
around  the  plantation  (Huizer  1971).  In  1997-1998,  when  structural  adjustments
programs were adopted, the government sold it to Illovo Group and ED&F MAN British
Commodity Trader Company who revived production and the out-grower scheme and
expanded its area of control (Mwami 2011; Martiniello 2015).
9 In 1992, in the south-east of the Valley, in Ulanga District and in the west of Kilombero
District, the CDC acquired 28,000 ha of land in compensation for the Tanzanian debt
held by the CDC at that time. This investment covers 8,000 ha of teak on four different
plantations  and  20,000 ha  of  conservation  area  that  serves  as  an  environmental
corridor between the Selous Game Reserve to the east and the Kilombero wetlands and
Udzungwa National Park to the west. One of the four plantations is located near the
Matundu Forest Reserve (part of the Kilombero Nature Reserve), to the west, on the
“Ruipa site” near Namwawala village. Likewise, in the south-west of the valley, with the
same “conservationist and reforestation” objectives, another large company is Green
Resources Ltd, established under the Clean Development Mechanism with the support
of the Norwegian embassy. This company bases its activities mainly on “plantations,
carbon offsets, forest products and renewable energy [and has] 34,000 ha of land, with a
further 120,000 ha in the process of acquisition” near Uchindile, straddling Kilombero
District, Mufindi and Kilolo (SAGCOT 2012; 2013; Bond et al. 2012).
10 Other  large-scale  plantations  were  demarcated  during  Ujamaa  Vijijini,  such  as  the
Mngeta Farm which was established in 1976 through a joint-venture with North Korea
—The Korean-Tanzania Joint  Agricultural  Company (KOTACO),  implemented in 1986
and abandoned in 1995 by the Korean partner (Oakland Institute 2015). In 2006, the
Rufiji Basin Development Agency (RUBADA) set up a joint-venture with InfEnergy—part
of Agrica Ltd, a British company registered in the Guernsey Island tax haven—to revive
the paddy farm on 5,900 ha, with the support of international institutions such as the
World Bank, the British Development Fund (DFID 2013),  and Bill  and Melinda Gates
Foundation  for  the  out-grower  schemes  and  development  aid  for  the  surrounding
villages.
11 Another plantation was demarcated by SUDECO during Ujamaa Vijijini (1974) on the so-
called “Ruipa site,” mentioned above, in order to cultivate sugar cane. This project was
revived in 2005 and is now the focus of the SAGCOT project. In this article, I will mainly
explore this case study, still under negotiation, as it can highlight the power relations
that  unfold  during  the  decision-making  process—giving  detail  about  this  complex
situation later.
12 In the valley, the enclosures also concern conservation areas such as the Udzungwa
National Park established in 1994, the Selous Game Reserve established in 1982, and the
RAMSAR site set up on 796,735 ha in 2002. A total of 91.4% of the Kilombero District is
thus  covered  by  conservation  areas  (SAGCOT  2012).  Since  1956,  the  Kilombero
floodplain  and  peripheral  areas  of  woodland  have  been  designated  as  a  Game
Controlled Area (GCA) and since 2002 as a RAMSAR site. Since 2012, the Kilombero GCA
has  been  managed  by  the  Belgium  Tanzania  Corporation  (BTC)  and  the  European
Union, in partnership with the SAGCOT for its  environment component (BTC 2016),
under the name KILORWEMP. A German company, AMBERO, is working with the BTC to
define the borders of the GCA and create Wildlife Management Areas. These are zones
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within villages which will be reserved for tourist hunting and therefore not used by
villagers.
13 Finally, large-scale investments do not target the historically controlled estates, but
can affect  spaces used by peasants,  pastoralists,  teachers,  traders,  and doctors  who
have  been  living  there  for  more  than  fifty  years,  mainly  with  customary  right  of
occupancy (CRO) granted by the local government. In October 2015, oil companies and
Tata  Petrodyne Swala  Oil  & Gas  Plc  Tanzania  signed a  farm-out  agreement  for  the
exploitation of oil and gas on a surface area of up to 6,000 ha in the Kidatu basin, north
of the valley. About 27,300 ha in the Kilombero Basin (the RAMSAR site in the center of
the Valley) and Kilosa (in Kilosa Valley) were also surveyed (Swala Energy website).
Furthermore, in 2009, to meet the growing demand for investment in agricultural land,
the Tanzanian government put in place new economic strategies through the Kilimo
Kwanza  (Agriculture  First)  initiative  under  the  Agricultural  Sector  Development
Program (ASDP). At the African World Economic Forum (WEF) 2010, President Jakaya
Kikwete decided to create a  corridor of  agricultural  modernization,  SAGCOT,  which
covers a third of the country. From Dar es Salaam to Tunduma, on the border with
Zambia, the corridor represents a delineated space in a heavily irrigable area in which
ecological and climate conditions would allow significant agricultural production that
could be easily transported and exported through the port of Dar es Salaam or to other
regions of the East African Community.
14 The Kilombero Valley is located within the Kilombero cluster, one of the six clusters of
the SAGCOT. It is considered to be the country’s breadbasket and is therefore one of the
most  coveted  areas,  as  highlighted  by  the  government  project:  “These  nearly
800,000 hectares of flood plain are among the most valuable in Tanzania for large-scale
paddy rice and sugarcane production due to seasonal flooding and potential for large-
scale irrigation schemes” (SAGCOT 2013: 27).
 
Land Conflicts and Evictions
15 Demographic growth rates are high in the Kilombero valley (117% since 1988, 26% since
2002 for a total population of 407,880 in 2012 according to the 2012 National Census).
This growth is essentially due to high rates of immigration of pastoralists and agro-
pastoralists  since 2000,  as  well  as  farmers,  workers  and investors  attracted by new
opportunities created by the large-scale plantations. In the valley, evictions and the
mobility they create are rooted in a long history. Resettlement planning started in the
1940s under British colonial rule and continued during the Ujamaa Vijijini period.
16 Nowadays the valley is the focus of conflicts involving pastoralists and farmers. In a
context of high demographic growth and an increase in mobility, where local demand
for  land  is  increasingly  sensitive,  the  reallocations  of  estates  to  new  international
investors has led to new conflicts over land. In 2006, evictions of pastoralists and agro-
pastoralists  from Mbarali  district,  Mbeya region,  following the privatization of  rice
farms, led to an increase in the arrival of people in the Morogoro region and especially
in the Kilombero valley (Tenga et al. 2008; Maganga et al. 2009). Here, conflicts have
significantly increased since the establishment of the Kilombero GCA in 2012. This site
covers a total of 108 villages—72 villages in Kilombero and 36 villages in Ulanga (Siima
et al.  2012:  134).  According to the RAMSAR site  agreement (2002),  “the bulk of  the
estimated population is confined to a strip of 858,850 ha of mixed arable land, wetland
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and Miombo woodland. The only room for expansion is into the floodplain or south-
west along the valley.” According to the Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC), the
Kilombero GCA could involve 126 villages and remove access to arable land for more
than 600,000 people in Kilombero and Ulanga districts (LHRC, interview with Godfrey
Lwena,  Namwawala  ward  councillor,  20-08-2015).  Researchers  reported  killings,
stealing of pastoralists’ cattle, and revenge attacks that led to murders or the burning
of  yield  crops.  Pastoralists  and  farmers  complain  that  the  RAMSAR  site  enclosed
400,000 ha  of  grazing  and  farming  lands.  In  2012,  police-patrolled  operations  used
trucks to evict more than 200,000 cattle. Between 2012 and 2014, several altercations
between policemen and pastoralists resulted in injuries and killings, notably in Chita
ward (Kitabu 2012; Nindi et al. 2014; interviews with villagers Ifakara; IWGIA 2013). The
RAMSAR site enclosure is an even more sensitive issue for the villages surrounding the
newly  established  plantations.  The  recent  renewed  enclosure  of  5,900 ha  by  the
Kilombero  Plantation  Ltd,  only  exacerbated  the  scarcity  of  land  created  by  the
proximity of the RAMSAR site to the east and the Udzungwa and Lyondo escarpment
forest to the west, and significantly increased local land conflicts.
17 The involvement of international financial institutions, agribusiness firms and national
government agencies in the enclosure of large-scale plots of land is part of a complex
and  long-standing  system  of  actors.  Recent  investments  are  one  more factor  to
consider. They go hand in hand with a discourse on “development” aid in which the
private  investor  is  seen  as  a  necessary  social  actor.  The  analysis  of  development
projects within large-scale investments will now allow us to address the formation of a
“local  political  arena” (Olivier  de  Sardan  1995)  within  which  “local  development
brokers” (Bierchenk 1993) or “gatekeepers” (Ansom, et al. 2014; M’Bokolo 2004: 389;
Peemans 2014) evolve.
 
From Post-Colonial “Local Elites” to Post-Socialist
Local Governments
Beyond any Historical Determinism: the Social Construction of
Local Decision-Makers
18 Numerous studies highlight the predominant role of national and local elites in land
grabs,  especially  in  the  Great  Lakes  region and in  East  Africa  (Wolford et  al. 2013;
Ansoms et  al.  2014;  Bernstein 1981).  It  is  claimed that  so-called “foreign investors”
often collaborate with the “locals” or employ them in key positions at different stages
of  their  investment  programs,  notably  when  negotiating  land  access  with  village
authorities.  However,  the  various  waves  of  land  grabs  in  the  region  have  always
involved  numerous  actors  at  global,  regional,  national  and local  levels.  Indeed,  “at
various periods of the history, local African elites have used their status and power as
well as their familiarity with the institutional and legal contexts to acquire large land
concessions” (Claessens et al. 2014: 83). They are more likely to be able to navigate the
complex  institutional  landscape  and  thus  to  “gain  comparative  advantages  at  the
expense of poorer and less well-connected actors” (Ibid).
19 Bearing  in  mind  the  role  of  the  “local  elites”  (Ansoms  et  al.  2014)  in  land  grab
processes, it is crucial to explore the history of their formation given that they “do not
develop  out  of  the  blue.  They  are  the  product  of  local  stories,  and  operate  within
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networks” (Olivier de Sardan 1995: 16113). It is also necessary to define what we mean
by “local elite” and the extent and limitations of this concept. The term “local elite” is
often used to designate the “authority,” representing those who have more financial,
economic  and  socio-cultural  capital  than  others,  yet  without  describing  how  these
individuals—and the group they may form—acquired this status, that is to say, in which
situation and through which mechanisms they became such an “elite.” They may also be
referred to as “local development brokers” (Bierschenk et al. 2000), “gatekeepers,” the
“rich and powerful,” or the “the powerful chiefly” (Martin 1988). All these terms refer
to the category of those who generally dominate the decision-making process and the
economic and political development of the villages. However, power is not necessarily
in the hands of those who are recognized as “policymakers.” It can also be acquired,
controlled, or maintained by individuals, groups, or institutions in particular political,
economic and cultural circumstances. These may be “traditional authorities,” linked to
national NGOs, community activists,  wealthier farmers,  entrepreneurs arriving from
urban areas or other densely populated spaces in search of land or new activities to
develop, highly educated people returning to their home village, church leaders, elders,
etc.
20 In Tanzania, Martin showed how colonization led to regional and social imbalances,
based upon ecological disparities and the specific interests of the colonial state. The
policy  changed  in  the  mid-1950s,  which  saw  an  increase  in  official  financial  and
technical  support  for  commercial  agriculture  in  Africa,  widened  the “gap  between
wealthier  farmers  and  others”  (Martin  1988:  187).  Favoring  the  “‘tractor  farmers’;
“these  famous  modernist  peasants  [were]  dear  to  the  heart  of  the  colonial
administration”14 (Ibid.: 187). These “modernist peasants” were already in a “better”
position before the colonial period, being traditional chiefs and therefore in a position
to increase their power. Based on a study carried out in 1969, Martin argues that social
differentiation was mainly the result of the importance of non-agricultural resources
and wages from public service jobs. Although agricultural and land resources were not
directly  linked  to  social  differentiation,  it  is  recognized  that  the  other  incomes
generated  by  non-agricultural  resources  and  wages  from  public  service  jobs  were
earned by the “wealthier colonial farmers”—sometimes considered as “colons right-
hand men” (Fanon 1961)—who could concentrate lands and enhance their economic
capital  while  aiding  the  penetration  of  the  colonial  machine.  Furthermore,  British
colonization through the Colonial Office had already initiated a vast decentralization
program,  expressing  in  1947  the  desire  to  “develop  an  effective  system  of  local
government”  (Calas  2006).  In  1967,  three  years  after  independence,  Julius  Nyerere,
advised by the Company MacInsey and Company Inc. (Kubala 1993, quoted by Calas
2006) developed a vast decentralization program and argued in favor of it in his book
Decentralization (Nyerere 1972). After independence and the adoption of a single-party
government supported by a cumbersome structured governmental system, a majority
of the wealthier farmers took political positions. They used the political infrastructure
and policies to “reap the benefits to access credit, agricultural inputs, land; initiating,
despite the abolition of private property, enterprises of concentration”15 (Martin 1988:
187). Indeed, civil servants and permanent members of the party who were elected or
nominated were supposed to control the redistribution and use of land in the villages.
However,  in  order  to  maintain  control  over  these  resources,  notables  and  wealthy
farmers  concluded  alliances  with  local  policymakers.  On  the  other  hand,  inserting
notable leaders in the circle of  local  government was a means through which local
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government members could have a direct influence over local resources and control
local  populations.  Thus,  they  could  channel  their  political  opinions,  thanks  to  the
authority and socio-cultural capital held by the notables and the already established
local  clienteles  and  social  network.  It  was  further  exacerbated  “in  1967  [with]  the
creation  of  the  Regional  Development  Fund  [which]  gave  to  the  civil  servants/
permanent [members of the party] the means to build networks capable of including
clienteles patronized by notables.”16 This privileged relationship between civil servants
from  the  local  government  and  the  “wealthier  farmers”  benefitted  both  parties,
assuring the social position of the farmers while allowing control over the rest of the
population  (Martin  1988:  220).  According  to  Huizer  (1971),  indeed,  “the  wealthier
farmers  were  found  to  exercise  considerable  control  within  the  Ujamaa  system,
because they were in a position to transfer usufruct rights of lands to poorer peasants
who, in exchange, had to serve the ‘patron’ in several ways. This included participating
in communal work parties,  but also in electing the ‘patron’  to key positions in the
TANU  branch  or  ten-house  cell.  This  patron-client  relationship  encroached  on  the
egalitarian ideas behind the Ujamaa programme. It was difficult, however, to introduce
anything into the villages without the consent and support of the local elites” (Huizer
1971: 28-29). Finally, little by little, drawing on these alliances, the wealthier farmers
entered politics, and some of them are still governing the villages today.
21 It is important to bear in mind that the dynamics at local level are still today governed
by patronage, brokerage networks and factional rivalries involving external and local
actors.  During the electoral  campaign,  the different political  brokerage networks in
presence  built  up  new  nodes,  while  factional  rivalries,  competitions  and  alliances
involved  the  district  authorities  and  representatives  of  parastatal  and  foreign
companies.  A  “cycle  of  factional  struggles  involving  citizens,  community  leaders,
administrative or appointed [or elected] political leaders”17 (Martin 1988: 223) forms a
complex system of stakeholders, linking people in the villages to the highest level of
government. This explains the coexistence of multiple centers of power, of different
importance  and  jurisdiction  that  are  “more  or  less  articulated,  hierarchical  or
competing,  and  often  fall  under  successive  historical  sedimentation”18 (Olivier  de
Sardan 1995: 165).
 
The Ruipa Site and the 2015 Elections Campaign
22 To exemplify my argument, I will now describe the situation observed in the Ruipa site,
located  at  the  center  of  the  Kilombero  Valley.  In  1976,  SUDECO  surveyed  and
demarcated 9,272.54 ha with a view to establishing a sugar cane plantation in the Ruipa
Valley, close to the Kilombero River. However, 400 parastatal companies went bankrupt
that year, so the plantation could not be set up at that time. As a consequence, the
demarcated  area  was  colonized  by  people  arriving  as  part  of  the  Ujamaa  Vijijini
program and the TAZARA railway development (Chachage 2010). The first village was
Mofu;  then  Mbingu,  Namwawala  and  Idete  grew  up  along  the  railway.  The  only
historical proof of the demarcation today is a map showing the blocks of the intended
plantation. This area represents 62% of the affected villages. At the outset, the total
project  was  divided  into  six  blocks  (A,  B,  C,  D,  E  and  F),  but  due  to  a  significant
population increase, SUDECO abandoned blocks D, E and F. The three remaining blocks
represent:  block A Kisegese:  863.53 ha;  block B Namwawala & Mofu: 6,032.55 ha and
block  C  Mbingu  &  Mofu:  2,376.46 ha.  Namwawala  and  Mofu  are  the  most  affected
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villages, where “population is nearly 10,000 people each” (Kipobota et al. 2009). In 2005,
the  government  and  the  SBT,  through  the  district  officers,  wanted  to  reallocate
“ownership”  of  the  land to  a  private  foreign investor,  Illovo  Group,  which  already
controlled the Kilombero Sugar Cane plantation in Kidatu. In 2012, Illovo pulled out of
the “multi-billion deal  “due to endless  conflicts” (Rugonzibwa 2012).  Conflicts  were
intensified by the establishment of the RAMSAR site to the east and the expansion of
the  Matundu  Forest  Reserve  to  the  north-west  and  of  other  already  established
plantations like  the Mbingu Sisters  farm in Mbingu (1,214 ha),  the Mofu Farms Ltd
(500 ha) in Ihenga hamlet, the Usafirishaji Mikoani Union debating ownership of a land
area (1,500 ha) in Chiwachiwa, the KVTC sites of Ichima and Narabungu sites in the
Matundu Forest Reserve close to Namwawala and Idete villages, and the Idete prison
farm (6,000 ha).
23 The land was earmarked as “free land for investment.” It was promoted during the
Agribusiness Investment Forum held in Dar es Salaam in November 2012,  as  a  final
stage  of  “site  preparation  in  order  to  promote  and  lease  it  to  qualified  investors”
(SAGCOT 2012: 30). However, the current situation as observed during field work and
reported by the villagers shows that the area is densely populated and the scarcity of
land has led to severe local land conflicts. Interviews revealed that ownership of this
land is not in the hands of the government, and the so-called participatory process
required to acquire and allocate village lands is not respected. On the contrary, since
2005,  several  events  highlighted  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  power  and  the  coercive
nature  of  consultations  with  villagers.  In  2008,  the  Village  Land  Use  Plans  for
Namwawala, Mofu and Kisegese, proposed by the district authorities to the Villages
Assemblies, show the area demarcated for the sugar cane plantation, under the names “
uwekezaji” (investment) or “shamba la miwa” (sugar cane plantation). The Village Land
Use Plan had to be agreed by the Village Assembly and fraudulent VA minutes were
produced  by  the  village  leaders,  using  the  names  of  dead  people,  children  and
foreigners  in  order  to  provide  district  authorities  with  the  necessary  documents
(interviews in Idandu 30 July 2015; LHRC 2010; Bergius 2015). In Namwawala, during a
Village Assembly on 31 January 2009,  following the radio announcement by district
authorities saying that villagers should prepare themselves for the upcoming valuation
process,  villagers,  together  with  the  acting  village  chairman,  started  to  organize
themselves  as  a  resistance  committee.  Villagers  in  Mofu,  Kisegese  and  Namwawala
organized a committee to monitor the order, but district authorities prevented them
from doing so; those “who would go against the national interest would be punished,”
they said through a national newspaper. The same has happened several times since
then (Chachage 2010; interviews Godfrey Lwena, 08/2016). Several cases of corruption
also  occurred  during  the  negotiation  process,  involving  both  village  and  district
authorities.  They  resulted  in  case  N°40/2012  being  brought  before  Tanzania’s  High
Court.
 
The Land Transfer in the Political Struggle of the Campaign
24 This section describes in greater detail the power relationships outlined above, which
have been built up on the basis of the historical social networks existing in the different
villages involved. In the oldest village, Mofu, there are six main families—which I will
call N, C, M, K, S, and Mb—all the members of which are related. The local government
was  historically  ruled  by  N,  the  wealthiest  family.  In  January 2010,  the  father  was
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elected CCM ward chancellor and his son village chairman. Ever since the colonial era,
when the men were traditional chiefs of the villages, members of the N family have
increased  their  influence  and  consolidated  their  power  by  acquiring  large  plots  of
lands, marrying several wives, expanding their “control area” and accumulating socio-
political  and economic capital.  Interestingly,  all  the prominent families  who gained
power are related; the CHADEMA candidate from the C family, for example, also told us
that the previous ward chancellor from CCM was his uncle. During the 2015 campaign,
some people said that “those people know how to make money, so if we elect them,
they  will  redistribute  it  to  us,  they  will  bring  development  in  Mofu.”  Opponents,
however, insisted that “things have to change, we don’t want this family governing us
anymore, it’s like a monarchy” (interviews with Mofu villagers, 23 August 2015). During
the campaign, the N son was candidate for the ward election and was in favor of a new
investment,  which  could  bring  “development,”  “money”  and  new opportunities  to
Mofu village. In Namwawala village, newcomers who were running businesses wanted
the investment in the Rupia site to be successful because it would bring more clients,
new roads, electricity and market access. But claims to retain access to the land area in
question could also come from wealthier farmers: in Namwawala, Godfrey Lwena, the
ward candidate for CHADEMA, was the only person to have an official title deed for one
of his plots, where he resides. His father, Joachim Lwena, was the village chairperson
from 2000 to 2004 and has been a resident of the area since 1971. He possesses several
plots and his son is also a representative of the Namwawala resistance committee.
25 In  the  Ruipa  site,  “the  pluralistic  configuration  of  interests”  (Ansoms  et  al.  2014)
highlighted during the campaign reflects a number of different factors, including the
amount of land held and its localization, the main socio-economic activity,  the link
with political administrators, or the time spent in this area. Voting intentions varied
according to the issues at stake: the farmers, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists who live
on the project area in Myomboni (former hamlet of Mofu) and Idandu (former hamlet
of Namwawala) were calling for official  right of  occupancy and legal recognition of
their village. They were pushing candidates to give priority to the land issue, judging
the future elected bodies or individuals in terms of their sincerity and power. Even
within  the  same  political  party,  candidates  could  disagree  on  the  issue  of  future
investment in the Rupia site. Those who lived on the coveted land fought to raise this
issue  during  the  campaign  while  others  were  keen  to  welcome  the  investment.
Tensions were visible even during the primaries organized to select the candidate. The
CCM in Namwawala ward did not select the candidate who was living in the planned
area, Mr. S, who was also a member of the resistance committee. On the contrary, they
voted  for  a  candidate  who lived  in  Ifakara,  far  from the  planned area.  During  the
electoral campaign meetings held in the villages, as well as in hoteli discussions and
street-corner  talks,  villagers  repeatedly  debated  local  practices  of  cronyism.  For
instance, one day, in a hoteli in the center of Namwawala, women shouted at Mr. C, who
had just been chosen as the CCM candidate. They argued that “he is for the investment
because he has no land there.” Indeed, Mr. C, also the former Ward Executive Officer,
had promoted inward investment in the Rupia site since 2000. Nevertheless, due to the
popularity  of  the  CHADEMA  candidate  in  Namwawala,  the  CCM  candidate  had  to
change his position and promised that villagers’ land rights would be secured.
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About “Modernization” and “Development”
26 Election campaigns bring to light political patronage networks as well as nepotism and
clientelism both through discourse and practice. Those who want to gain power make
rhetorical use of future development plans to control both the space and the social
network that is built on it and that shapes it. The promised “development” is often top-
down, designed and developed by international funding agencies, public and private
institutions, companies and pension funds. Indeed, since colonization, the ideology of
development  has  historically  been  adapted—in  discourses  and  practices—from  the
international level to the local socio-economic level for the expansion of capitalism.
Therefore, “we must reiterate that the principles of development have strengthened
the  administrative  and  technical  coercion  of  the  rural  world.  (…)  The  ideology  of
development deals with nature, space and society. The main idea is that nature is a
given capital (the famous ‘natural resources’);  forgetting that this ‘nature’ is or was
already  ordered,  mediated  and  socialized  in  the  organization  of  native  societies”19
(Charlery de la  Masselière 2014:  42).  In Tanzania,  from the colonial  period and the
Ujamaa Vijijini program after the Arusha declaration to the Iringa declaration in 1974
and  now  the new  Kilimo  Kwanza initiative,  many  “development”  plans  have  linked
together land and agriculture, having a structuring effect on both landscapes and local
governance practices. After the economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
implementation of the three-year Economic Recovery Plan drawn up by the IMF and
the World Bank was a milestone in the development of the country's agricultural and
land policies. In 1997, the government created the Tanzania Investment Act No. 26 and
established the Tanzania Investment Center (ICT) to “coordinate, promote, facilitate
and  encourage  investment  in  Tanzania”  (ICT  1997).  Then,  in  1999,  Vision  2025
established  a  development  program  for  the  long  term,  in  particular  with  the
implementation  of  the  initiative  Mkakati  wa  Kukuza  Uchumi  Na  Kupunguza  Umaskini
Tanzania (MKUKUTA)—the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (URT
2005).
27 As part of MKUKUTA, Kilimo Kwanza was set up in 2009 with the objective of giving
agriculture a central role in the Tanzanian economy in order to promote the country’s
growth and development.  To attract investors,  the government has actively promoted
private investment and facilitated it through the TIC and the Tanzania Investment Act
of 1999.  The SAGCOT gives priority to foreign investors:  “strengthening the private
sector in the country is one of our priorities” (Mary Michael Nagu, Minister of State for
Investment  &  Empowerment,  2015).  Furthermore,  to  counter  the  recent  worldwide
criticisms  of  “land  grabbing,”  the  government  stipules  that:  “Tanzania  does  not
discriminate against  businesses conducted or owned by foreign investors.  It  has no
recent history of  expropriation or nationalization” (SAGCOT 2012).  The first  official
objective of the government through the SAGCOT is to link smallholder farmers with
agribusiness  “to  improve  agricultural  productivity  and  increase  rural  incomes  and
employment opportunities” (SAGCOT 2013).
28 The SAGCOT is not well known in the villages. Field work revealed that most of the
villagers were not familiar with this program and even district officials had only heard
about  it.  It  is  seen  as  a  “top-down,”  non-inclusive  and  fairly  obscure  initiative.
Nevertheless, everyone is aware that the valley and its development attract a great deal
of attention, and plans for the establishment of large-scale farms are well known. Local
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elites  use  the  discourse  of  the  international  organizations  to  implement  top-down
development projects, that is, to bring “development” through the necessary foreign
investment, modernize Tanzanian agriculture by connecting small-scale farmers to the
market, and set up estates and out-grower schemes. The investments planned for the
Kilombero valley do not concern the enclosed space per se. The 2015 electoral campaign
revealed that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in development projects was at the
heart  of  the  candidates’  promises.  It  highlights  the  importance  of  the  “project-
language” (Olivier de Sardan 1988: 166),  used by “modernist” notables and officials,
who are ambitious, open to the outside world and interested in politics: thus, “they can
talk together, they have a common language”20 (Martin 1988: 220).
29 Conceptions  of  foreign  and  wealthy  investors  are  rooted  in  a  long  history.  Some
authors defined the Kilombero Sugar Cane Ltd plantation as a “‘frontier area’ (Cliffe
1977),  characterized  by  the  penetration  and  settlements  of  European  (and  other
foreign) farmers, increased capitalist production methods, the ensuing need for labour,
and  the  integration  of  smallholders  within  the  circuit  of  agribusiness”  (Martinielli
2015).  Interestingly,  on  22 October  2015,  Prime  Minister  Mizengo  Pinda  held  a
conference with the Kilombero Sugar Plantation Ltd representatives. He congratulated
the  “residents  of  Kidatu  and  Kilombero  [who]  have  been  able  to  construct  decent
houses,  run some auxiliary businesses,  and most importantly take their  children to
school”  (The  Guardian 22 October  2015),  thus  highlighting  the  links  between  multi-
scalar political relations and agricultural development. Indeed, the out-grower schemes
and jobs generated by the plantation had attracted new investors and new workers,
creating  a  de  facto land  market  and  prompting  demographic  growth  that  has
transformed urbanization dynamics.
30 The promises of what Prime Minister Pinda called “market-led development” were re-
appropriated and repeated by local ward candidates in different villages of the valley.
They do not hesitate to exploit the promotion of investment to enhance their power
and influence voting.  Similarly,  local  politicians  promise  employment,  development
and better social services in the investment areas. However, field data from the 2015
election prove not only that these promises are never fulfilled,  but that sometimes
what happens is in fact the opposite of what was initially promised. In some places, the
same people who had been eagerly waiting for employment not only end up never
getting a job but are actually evicted from their land. Ariel Crozon revealed similar
processes  in  the 1995 election,  when CCM members and opposition party members
were all engaged in “reckless promises to the peasants” (Crozon 1998: 164). In 2015,
candidates promised to get rid of “irresponsible investors” and instead “recognize the
rights of peasants and pastoralists on the land,” while others promoted investment for
“communication, social  services (school,  health services,  employment for youth and
women), and money.”
31 By promising development through modernized agriculture as opposed to traditional and
unproductive agriculture,  the  market-led  ideology  behind  the  SAGCOT  program  is
accompanied by the dominant thinking on the availability of land in Tanzania, which
highlights the abundance of “idle and unused lands.” Since the colonial era,
development models based on agricultural production have always postulated the need
for effective demarcation to establish confined spaces and private property—with only
partial recognition of customary rights. During the election campaign, meetings held to
present the land targeted for investment to villagers focused on the two issues of legal
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recognition of ownership and the securing of land. In Mofu, Namwawala and Mbingu
villages, wealthy farmers who did not fear any loss of land argued that those who had
arrived after the demarcation in the 1980s were “illegal squatters” and “invaders” who
should “go back to their land they were living on before” (Mofu focus group, 08/2015)
and leave space for the new plantations.  On the other hand, the inhabitants of  the
coveted lands also claimed legal recognition of ownership, based upon the customary
right of occupancy (CROs) they had obtained from the village council. However, they
were granted their CROs in controversial circumstances: the village chairpersons were
said to have sold some plots to the newcomers illegally, since they were fully aware of
the SUDECO demarcation. The superposition of different types of rights is materialized
in the Village Land Use Plans in the villages concerned.
32 Mofu is the oldest village in the Ruipa site.  Its inhabitants know the history of the
planned SUDECO plantation of 1976 even though they had settled in the 1950s in an
area that was not directly concerned by the project.  During the last  election,  ward
candidates  and their  supporters  repeatedly  promised development  through land.  A
former village chairman explained: “Through the investments roads will be improved,
social services improved (schools, health), employment and hence financial incomes for
individuals and for the village in general, population will also increase as more people
will come to look for jobs” (Mofu focus group, 08/2015). Taking as an example the KSCL
plantation, the candidates also exploited the imagined abundance of capital, modernity
and prosperity that investors would bring in.21 The former village chairman continued,
insisting that investors could “use the money earned by selling sugar cane to buy rice
for consumption purposes” (20 August 2015). According to him, villagers would benefit
from cultivating sugar cane, seen as “more profitable and less labor-demanding than
paddy” (Ibid.). Political candidates in favor of the plantation also talked up the benefits
of infrastructure development and money circulation. For instance, the CCM candidate,
a member of the wealthiest N family, drew a parallel with Mngeta where, he said, “even
corporate  responsibility  is  assured.” He  used  expectations  of  “employment,”  “road
construction  and maintenance,”  and  “electricity  and  water  access”  to  promote  the
Rupia investment and simultaneously  campaign for  his  political  candidacy:  “This  is
what  will  happen  for  us  too,  trust  me”  (CCM  political  meeting,  Mofu  village,
August 2015).  These  promises  resonate  with  those  made  in  Mngeta  in  2008.  There,
village representatives and district authorities had similarly promised that roads would
be improved, electricity and water supplied, and land and new jobs made available for
all thanks to the new company (interviews and focus groups, 8 August 2016). However,
seven  years  later,  as  field  work  revealed,  the  main  road  had  been  cut  off  by  the
company,  there  is  no  electricity  supply,  water  is  polluted  from  the  spraying  of
herbicides  by  airplane,  and  employment  is  mainly  casual,  for  an  average  monthly
salary of 150,000 Tsh (61€). In spite of this, today’s candidates continue to use their
ability  to  travel  and establish business  relationships  out  of  the  villages  to  create  a
picture of development based on large-scale agriculture.
33 On the Ruipa site, opposition to the sugar cane plantation has been strong, and even
stronger in the hamlets directly targeted by the sugar cane project. These hamlets are
principally  composed  of  people  who  were  evicted  from  the  northern  part  of  the
Kilombero valley, especially from Msolwa Station—Magombiro hamlet—following the
expansion of KSCL plantation in 1998. In 2002, some villagers moved to Idandu (Cha
Moto,  Michundani  hamlets),  Namwawala  (Namwawala  A,  Kichongani  hamlets)  and
Mofu (Miyomboni, Ihenga hamlets), all of which are located in the area concerned by
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the sugar cane project. These villagers related their experiences of the evictions and
the  increased  capital  inequalities  in  the  villages  surrounding  the  plantation.
Interviewees  spoke of  “neocolonialism” and insisted that  “development  would only
benefit  the  companies”  (interviews  in  Idandu,  Kirukutu  and  Kichongani  hamlets,
08/2015).  They  mentioned  a  number  of  challenges  they  had  had  to  face  since  the
privatization, notably that they had been crowded onto less fertile land. Farmers did
not want to be displaced again, qualifying themselves as “cattle, slaves in their own
country” (focus group Idandu, 08/2015). It is no surprise that they made up the bulk of
the  resistance  committee  created  in  2009.  Denouncing  government  corruption  at
multiple levels, they blamed investors for their “irresponsibility,” employing the same
terms as those used in official discourses and taking as examples what happened in
Kidatu and Mngeta. Opponents were also pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, mainly the
Sukuma, originally from Shinyanga, Mwanza, Simyu and Mara regions. Following the
privatization of a rice plantation in the Uanga plain of Mbarali district in Mbeya region
(Matee and Shem 2006), they were evicted and migrated into the valley. They came to
Morogoro  region  on  the  advice  of  the  former  Regional  Commissioner,  Mr.  Steven
Mashishanga, himself a Sukuma. The evictions of 2012-2014 in the Kilombero Valley
have not been forgotten and people mistrust or are tired of the ruling party. During the
2015 campaign, the opponents and resistance committee members proved to be very
influential; they were able to mobilize villagers and influence political party members.
They could also help a candidate by persuading voters to vote for him or her.  The
candidates, always in need of more support, had as a result to adapt their discourse to
please their potential electors.
 
Conclusion
34 After Tanzania’s October 2015 general election, the three wards of the Kilombero valley
located on the  sugar  cane  plantation project  switched from the  ruling  CCM to  the
opposition  party  CHADEMA.  The  two  constituencies  of  Ifakara  and  Mlimba  in
Kilombero District, which is part of historically CCM-ruled Morogoro Region, were also
won by the CHADEMA. This opposition win reflected dissatisfaction with the ruling
party and its local elites, notably with the way they had managed land at the local level
for decades. The electoral process itself was highly tense in the whole district. The main
reasons given by the villagers interviewed in different areas of the district were lack of
development (lack of electricity while the district provides the whole Morogoro region
with the Kihansi Hydropower plant; lack of tarmac roads and water access) but also
evictions and land enclosures.  Another factor cited was high immigration rates and
demographic mobility. In Ifakara, the district capital city, press releases highlighted
aggressive  and  sometimes  destructive  behaviors  during  voting  day:  “37  people
allegedly stormed the voting centre, set fire to government buildings and destroyed a
district council motor vehicle” (Daily News 29 October 2015).
35 Finally, the 2015 campaign brought to the fore issues of access to and control over land
and  made  it  possible  to understand  how the  struggles  for  land  significantly  shape
space. We have seen that these struggles for land are not new; they are rooted in a long
history of land conflicts and appropriations. The election highlighted those tensions,
revealing the complex and unstable webs of power relations between different actors at
different geographical and institutional scales who are involved in the access to and the
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maintenance and control of land. Local elites and wards candidates used the existing
institutional land governance framework either to empower villagers and help them
retain  access  to  land  or  to  facilitate  the  planned  investments  through  coercive
consultancy. The election also had an impact on land negotiations and allocation. The
High Court case was postponed during the election, but more than one year on it was
still  pending.  One consequence of this is  that the Land Tenure Support Programme
(LTSP),  initiated  by  the  elected  president  John  Magufuli  on  18 February  2016  and
financed  by  DFID,  SIDA  (Sweden  aid)  and  DANIDA  (Denmark  aid),  cannot  be
implemented in the villages concerned by the case until the judgment is handed down.
Paradoxically, Kilombero, Ulanga and Malinyi districts in the Kilombero valley are the
three pilot districts at the national level. Large-scale enclosures have always created
conflicts, but with the new LTSP, the SAGCOT, the prohibited access to the Kilombero
Game Controlled Area and the expansion of the forest reserve, conflicts over land and
the  dynamics  of  power  relationships  will  undoubtedly  continue  well  beyond  the
election year.
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NOTES
1. Hoteli means “restaurant” in Kiswahili.
2. Lefebvre 1974.
3. Kawe MP Halima Mdee is well known in Tanzania for arguing against land grabbing
and for denouncing political bodies involved in illegal land investments. She has been
an MP since 2005 and is a member of the CHADEMA Central committee as well as the
Chairperson of  CHADEMA  Women’s  Wing  at  national  level  (www.parliament.go.tz/
administrations/31 [ archive]).  In  2014  she  publicly  accused  the  former  Minister  of
Land, Housing and Settlements, Anna Tibaijuka, of fueling land conflicts through her
ownership  of  large  plots  of  lands  (http://pesatimes.co.tz/news/legal-environment/
tibaijuka--halima-mdee-at-loggerheads/tanzania).
4. In Tanzania, the ward is the administrative level made up of at least three registered
villages.  In  January  2015,  several  wards  and  villages  of  the  Kilombero  valley  were
divided.  We  will  explain  later  how  this  subdivision,  carried  out  just  before  the
campaign, altered the local political dynamics. 
5. My translation from French: “(…) son entregent, sa proximité des centres du pouvoir,
la disponibilité de certaines ressources gouvernementales sinon même privées sont des
atouts considérables” (Martin 1988: 162).
6. Hamlet in Kiswahili.
7. My translation from French: “(…) non sur le terrain des institutions formelles, mais
sur  ‘celui  des  actions  qui  visent  le  maintien  ou  la  modification  de  l’ordre  établi’
(Balandier 1995: ix)” (Martin 1988: 9).
8. My  translation  from French:  “La  politique  se  construit  dans  l’espace  et  l’espace
construit la politique” (Dulucq & Soubias 2004: 9).
9. My  translation  from French:  “Il  y  a  politique  de  l’espace  parce  que  l’espace  est
politique” (Lefebvre 2000 [1974]).
10. Similar  declarations  were  also  made  during  the  Ugandan  election  campaign,
notably by the FDC Presidential candidate, Dr. Kizza Besigye, who “decried the high
cases of land grabbing in the sub-region, promising to end the vice once voted into
power”  (Saturday  Monitor 2016).  He  further  “pledged  to  return  all  grabbed  land  to
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owners” (Vision Group 2016). Even his opponent, Museveni “seeks to find solutions to
historical land injustices in Uganda, land disputes and conflicts” (Ibid.).
11. See for example Peemans 2014, Ansoms et al. 2014; Martiniello 2015; Mollel 2014.
12. SUDECO was a parastatal company established in 1974, and is now the Sugar Board
of Tanzania (SBT).
13. My translation from French: “Les courtiers du développement ne tombent pas du
ciel. Ils sont le produit d’histoires locales, et fonctionnent à l’intérieur de réseaux.”
14. My  translation  from  French: “‘Agriculteurs  à  tracteur’ ;  ces  fameux  paysans
modernistes chers au cœur de l’administration coloniale” (Martin 1988: 187).
15. My translation from French : “En tirer des bénéfices concernant l’accès au crédit,
encore ; aux intrants agricoles ; à la terre, amorçant, malgré l’abolition de la propriété
privée, des entreprises de concentration” (Martin 1988: 187).
16. My translation from French : “La création, en 1967, du Regional Development Fund,
donne aux fonctionnaires/permanents les moyens de constituer des réseaux capables
d’inclure les clientèles patronnées par des notables” (Martin 1988: 219).
17. My  translation  from  French: “Un  engrenage  de  niveaux  de  luttes  factionnelles
associant  les  citoyens,  les  notables,  les  responsables  administratifs  ou  politiques
nommés [ou élus] par le centre” (Martin 1988: 223).
18. My translation from French: “On a affaire à une coexistence de divers centres de
pouvoir,  d’importance et  d’aire  de compétence différentes,  plus  ou moins articulés,
hiérarchisés  ou  concurrents,  et  relevant  souvent  de  sédimentations  historiques
successives” (Olivier de Sardan 1995: 165).
19. My  translation  from  French:  “Il  faut  redire  que  ce  sont  bien  les  principes  du
développement qui ont renforcé la coercition administrative et technique du monde
rural. (…) L’idéologie du développement implique un projet sur la nature, l’espace et la
société.  L’idée  principale  est  que  la  nature  est  un  capital  donné  (les  fameuses
‘ressources  naturelles’) ;  exit le  fait  que  cette  ‘nature’  est  ou  était  déjà  ordonnée,
médiatisée et socialisée au sein de l’organisation des sociétés ‘indigènes’” (Charlery de
la Masselière 2014 : 42).
20. My translation from French:  “Tous [notables/fonctionnaires]  sont ‘modernistes’,
ambitieux,  ouverts  sur  le  monde  extérieur,  intéressés  par  la  politique:  ils  peuvent
parler ensemble, ils ont des langages communs” (Martin 1988 : 220).
21. Since the privatization of the Kilombero Sugar Company, the villages surrounding
the plantation have been rapidly urbanized and people arriving from outside the valley
continue to invest  in land and infrastructure facilities,  attracted by the sugar cane
market. The main crop grown is sugar cane and most of the previous food crops (rice,
maize, cassava) have been uprooted. 
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